Implementing strategy
Different strategies and measures have been implemented, with varying degrees of effectiveness.
Below is our assessment of the government's response based on what was written in its July 2020 document. We will reassess how this in the light of how well the intended response has been implemented in July 2022.
The grid gives our evaluation with a score. Below is the relevant text from the report and the response.
The grid gives our evaluation with a score. Below is the relevant text from the report and the response.
Accountability
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 12] This focus has led us to question who is responsible for broader work against the Russian threat and whether those organisations are sufficiently empowered to tackle a hostile state threat such as Russia. In some instances, we have therefore recommended a shift in responsibilities. In other cases, we have recommended a simplification; there are a number of unnecessarily complicated wiring diagrams that do not provide the clear lines of accountability that are needed.”
“[Paragraph 18] Accountability is an issue in particular – whilst the Foreign Secretary has responsibility for the NCSC, which is responsible for incident response, the Home Secretary leads on the response to major cyber incidents.
Indeed, there are a number of other Ministers with some form of responsibility for Cyber – the Defence Secretary has overall responsibility for Offensive Cyber as a ‘warfighting tool’ and for the National Offensive Cyber Programme, while the Secretary of State for the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) leads on digital matters, with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster being responsible for the National Cyber Security Strategy and the National Cyber Security Programme.
It makes for an unnecessarily complicated wiring diagram of responsibilities: this should be kept under review by the National Security Council (NSC).”
“[Paragraph 18] Accountability is an issue in particular – whilst the Foreign Secretary has responsibility for the NCSC, which is responsible for incident response, the Home Secretary leads on the response to major cyber incidents.
Indeed, there are a number of other Ministers with some form of responsibility for Cyber – the Defence Secretary has overall responsibility for Offensive Cyber as a ‘warfighting tool’ and for the National Offensive Cyber Programme, while the Secretary of State for the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) leads on digital matters, with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster being responsible for the National Cyber Security Strategy and the National Cyber Security Programme.
It makes for an unnecessarily complicated wiring diagram of responsibilities: this should be kept under review by the National Security Council (NSC).”
Government Response
“As the Committee notes, delivery of the Government’s Russia Strategy is coordinated through the Government’s Russia Unit, based in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and governance of the Strategy is led by the Russia and Ukraine National Security Implementation Group (NSIG) and kept under review by the National Security Council (NSC). Philip Barton has now been replaced by Tom Drew as Director General Consular and Security in the FCO and the cross-Government senior responsible officer for Russia.
There is a clear line of accountability for HMG’s policy on Russia: the Russia and Ukraine NSIG reports to the National Security Advisor and to Ministers on the National Security Council. Ultimate ministerial oversight is provided by the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary retains an important role in overseeing the work of GCHQ and SIS (which is the case for all geographical areas).
Delivering the ambition of the National Cyber Security Strategy requires a whole of Government and whole of society response, as it is about both national security and economic prosperity. Implementation of the National Cyber Security Strategy is overseen by the Paymaster General, who is accountable to Parliament for the Strategy and the accompanying £1.9 billion investment.
Ministerial responsibilities are clearly defined and necessarily distributed given the various departmental equities. This is brought together under the NSC, where priority activity and the balance of investment across the Strategy are agreed.”
There is a clear line of accountability for HMG’s policy on Russia: the Russia and Ukraine NSIG reports to the National Security Advisor and to Ministers on the National Security Council. Ultimate ministerial oversight is provided by the Prime Minister. The Foreign Secretary retains an important role in overseeing the work of GCHQ and SIS (which is the case for all geographical areas).
Delivering the ambition of the National Cyber Security Strategy requires a whole of Government and whole of society response, as it is about both national security and economic prosperity. Implementation of the National Cyber Security Strategy is overseen by the Paymaster General, who is accountable to Parliament for the Strategy and the accompanying £1.9 billion investment.
Ministerial responsibilities are clearly defined and necessarily distributed given the various departmental equities. This is brought together under the NSC, where priority activity and the balance of investment across the Strategy are agreed.”
Assessment of Progress
Response generally proves the ISC point, that accountability is complex and dispersed [12], with no-one bringing it together below the PM [18].
3/10 – MH
Overall Strategy
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 74] We fully recognise the very considerable pressures on the Agencies since 9/11, and that they have a finite amount of resource which they must focus on operational priorities. Nevertheless, reacting to the here and now is inherently inefficient and – in our opinion – until recently the Government had badly underestimated the Russian threat and the response it required.”
“[Paragraph 75] Accepting the counter-terrorism pressures on the operational organisations, there is nevertheless a question over the approach taken by the policy departments. We have previously discussed the extent to which economic policy dictated the opening of the UK to Russian investment.
This indicates a failure of the security policy departments to engage with this issue – to the extent that the UK now faces a threat from Russia within its own borders. What appears to have been a somewhat laissez-faire policy approach is less easy to forgive than that of the busy Agencies. We welcome the fact that this has now been recognised and appears to be changing.”
“[Paragraph 80] It is apparent that the cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy has certain similarities – both in format and more fundamentally – to the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. However, we understand that no direct lessons have been drawn from CONTEST in drawing up and implementing the strategy.”
“[Paragraph 85] …It is essential that HMG takes a broader view of the full spectrum of the Russian threat as the cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy develops and the use of the Fusion Doctrine increases.”
“[Paragraph 75] Accepting the counter-terrorism pressures on the operational organisations, there is nevertheless a question over the approach taken by the policy departments. We have previously discussed the extent to which economic policy dictated the opening of the UK to Russian investment.
This indicates a failure of the security policy departments to engage with this issue – to the extent that the UK now faces a threat from Russia within its own borders. What appears to have been a somewhat laissez-faire policy approach is less easy to forgive than that of the busy Agencies. We welcome the fact that this has now been recognised and appears to be changing.”
“[Paragraph 80] It is apparent that the cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy has certain similarities – both in format and more fundamentally – to the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. However, we understand that no direct lessons have been drawn from CONTEST in drawing up and implementing the strategy.”
“[Paragraph 85] …It is essential that HMG takes a broader view of the full spectrum of the Russian threat as the cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy develops and the use of the Fusion Doctrine increases.”
Government Response
“The Government has long recognised there is an enduring and significant threat posed by Russia to the UK and its allies, including conventional military capabilities, disinformation, illicit finance, influence operations, and cyber-attacks. As such, Russia remains a top national security priority for the Government. This is why in 2017 the Government implemented the NSC-endorsed Russia Strategy, and in 2017 established the cross-Government Russia Unit which brings together the UK’s diplomatic, intelligence and military capabilities to maximum effect.
The Government’s Russia Strategy does not just respond to the here and now; it is a 30 year strategy, designed in the long-term to move from a relationship of confrontation and challenge, which currently threatens our collective security and values, to a relationship where Russia chooses to work alongside the international community. The integrated and established nature of the Strategy and the Russia Unit was paramount to the immediate nature of the effective and coherent Salisbury response. We have shown in recent years that the UK takes the threat from Russia extremely seriously and will respond to and call out Russian aggression wherever it occurs.
The Committee doubts whether the Russia Strategy has learned any direct lessons from the CONTEST strategy. However, what has been fundamental to the delivery of the Government’s Russia Strategy is the application of ‘fusion doctrine’, which aims to deploy security, economic and influence capabilities to protect, promote and protect our national security, economic and influence interests.
This approach to cross-Government coordination was an important part of the lessons learned over the last fifteen years since the London terror attacks in 2005. In particular, the NSIG structure enables decisions to be taken in consultation with a broad range of Government departments that hold a stake in the policy on Russia; and in doing so allow balanced recommendations to be made to Ministers. This is one element of ‘fusion doctrine’ that the Committee’s report recognises is vital to how HMG delivers policy using all available levers and the Government will continue to adopt this approach.”
The Government’s Russia Strategy does not just respond to the here and now; it is a 30 year strategy, designed in the long-term to move from a relationship of confrontation and challenge, which currently threatens our collective security and values, to a relationship where Russia chooses to work alongside the international community. The integrated and established nature of the Strategy and the Russia Unit was paramount to the immediate nature of the effective and coherent Salisbury response. We have shown in recent years that the UK takes the threat from Russia extremely seriously and will respond to and call out Russian aggression wherever it occurs.
The Committee doubts whether the Russia Strategy has learned any direct lessons from the CONTEST strategy. However, what has been fundamental to the delivery of the Government’s Russia Strategy is the application of ‘fusion doctrine’, which aims to deploy security, economic and influence capabilities to protect, promote and protect our national security, economic and influence interests.
This approach to cross-Government coordination was an important part of the lessons learned over the last fifteen years since the London terror attacks in 2005. In particular, the NSIG structure enables decisions to be taken in consultation with a broad range of Government departments that hold a stake in the policy on Russia; and in doing so allow balanced recommendations to be made to Ministers. This is one element of ‘fusion doctrine’ that the Committee’s report recognises is vital to how HMG delivers policy using all available levers and the Government will continue to adopt this approach.”
Assessment of Progress
Quite evasive, dodging idea that Russian threat was underestimated before 2017 [74].
The 2017 strategy also seems unduly optimistic about the trajectory of UK-Russia relations, reinforcing ISC’s suspicion that economic policy is taking the lead [75].
Doesn’t directly address recommendations, obscuring whether lessons from the CONTEST strategy have been learned [80], and extent to which use of Fusion Doctrine is being extended as opposed to one-off “adoption”. [85]
The 2017 strategy also seems unduly optimistic about the trajectory of UK-Russia relations, reinforcing ISC’s suspicion that economic policy is taking the lead [75].
Doesn’t directly address recommendations, obscuring whether lessons from the CONTEST strategy have been learned [80], and extent to which use of Fusion Doctrine is being extended as opposed to one-off “adoption”. [85]
4/10 – MH
MI5/Police Close Working
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 81] There appear to be certain similarities between the struggle against terrorism and Hostile State Activity – particularly in terms of public awareness – and more could be done to leverage the Government’s experience on the former in relation to the latter. In particular, it is our view that while MI5 already works with the police regional Counter-Terrorism Units (which have responsibility for Hostile State Activity) there is scope for them to work more closely together in this area.”
Government Response
The Government notes this recommendation and agrees with the benefits of closer join up. MI5 has already developed closer working with Police and Home Office partners in tackling the threat posed by Hostile State Activity, including working together closely on a number of Hostile State Activity cases.
The Salisbury response and investigations in 2018 were led by Counter Terrorism Command, drawing on its expertise in investigating matters that pertain to national security. The Agencies continue to collaborate closely and productively with Police on all relevant Hostile State Activity cases.
MI5 welcomes the Home Office’s ongoing work on new legislation to counter Hostile State Activity, which will update existing criminal offences and introduce new powers to support the Police’s work on Hostile State Activity.
The Salisbury response and investigations in 2018 were led by Counter Terrorism Command, drawing on its expertise in investigating matters that pertain to national security. The Agencies continue to collaborate closely and productively with Police on all relevant Hostile State Activity cases.
MI5 welcomes the Home Office’s ongoing work on new legislation to counter Hostile State Activity, which will update existing criminal offences and introduce new powers to support the Police’s work on Hostile State Activity.
Assessment of Progress
Generally agrees with recommendation and, although imprecise, contains a commitment to closer working between MI5 and the police.
9/10 – L
Pace of Response
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 83] Policy responsibility for Hostile State Activity sits in the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. This appears unusual: the Home Office might seem a more natural home for it, as it would allow [the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism’s] experience on counter-terrorism matters to be brought to bear against the hostile state threat. We understand that Government’s view is that Hostile State Activity is a cross-cutting threat and therefore it makes sense for the Cabinet Office to hold responsibility; we nonetheless suggest that it is kept under review.”
Government Response
“As the report notes, our adversaries adopt a whole of state approach to hybrid and malign activity. Tackling it therefore requires a cross-Government and cross-society response, drawing on the skills, resources and remits of different departments, agencies and non-Government organisations. Accordingly, this activity is coordinated by the Cabinet Office with individual Government departments and the Security and Intelligence Agencies playing a key role in all relevant areas. However, the NSC will keep this and all aspects of the Government’s approach to Hostile State Activity under review.”
Assessment of Progress
Agreed.
10/10 – L
Continuous Review of Policy Responsibility
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 96] It is not clear to the Committee whether HMG and our allies have yet found an effective way to respond to the pace of Russian decision-making. This has severely undermined the West’s ability to respond effectively to Russian aggressions in the past – for example, the annexation of Crimea in 2014. By contrast, the pace of the response to the Salisbury attack was impressive. However, ***: a way must be found to maintain this momentum across government.”
Government Response
“The Committee notes that the Russian leadership has shown to have an ability to make decisions quickly and unexpectedly, demonstrated by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (although, as the Committee has noted, the Kremlin operates without democratic or consensus-based decision-making structures or culture and outside the rules-based international order).
The Government agrees with the Committee on the importance of being able to act decisively and with appropriate speed as was demonstrated in the response to the Salisbury attack. The structures put in place to implement the Government’s Russia Strategy enable the Government to respond at pace to Russia’s actions, most notably in the aftermath of the Salisbury attack in 2018. These have been maintained since.”
The Government agrees with the Committee on the importance of being able to act decisively and with appropriate speed as was demonstrated in the response to the Salisbury attack. The structures put in place to implement the Government’s Russia Strategy enable the Government to respond at pace to Russia’s actions, most notably in the aftermath of the Salisbury attack in 2018. These have been maintained since.”
Assessment of Progress
Agreed, although not clear that HMG sees this as a continuing challenge.
9/10 – L
International Coalition
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 125] The UK intelligence and security community must equip itself to tackle the Russian threat, but we must also look beyond the UK itself. The Kremlin has shown a willingness and ability to operate globally to undermine the West, seeking out division and intimidating those who appear isolated from the international community. The West is strongest when acting in coalition, and therefore the Agencies and DI have a role to play in encouraging its international partners to draw together.”
“[Paragraph 132] In terms of its ‘near abroad’, Russia clearly intends keeping these countries within its ‘sphere of influence’ and conducts cyber activity and pursues economic policy to that end in ***. HMG initiatives *** are therefore essential; however, we note that this is not a short-term project: continuing investment and a long-term strategy are required *** against Russian influence.”
“[Paragraph 136] Salisbury must not be allowed to become the high water mark in international unity over the Russia threat; coherent and sustained strategy is needed in order to build on this success, and to make sure these lessons are internalised for similar events, be they targeted towards the UK or its allies. It is clear that restraining Russian activities in the future will rely on making sure that the price the Russians pay for such interference is sufficiently high. The UK intelligence and security community must ensure that private collaboration supports and complements continued public exposure of Russian activities, and the building of a broad international coalition that is willing to act quickly and decisively against Russian aggression.”
“[Paragraph 132] In terms of its ‘near abroad’, Russia clearly intends keeping these countries within its ‘sphere of influence’ and conducts cyber activity and pursues economic policy to that end in ***. HMG initiatives *** are therefore essential; however, we note that this is not a short-term project: continuing investment and a long-term strategy are required *** against Russian influence.”
“[Paragraph 136] Salisbury must not be allowed to become the high water mark in international unity over the Russia threat; coherent and sustained strategy is needed in order to build on this success, and to make sure these lessons are internalised for similar events, be they targeted towards the UK or its allies. It is clear that restraining Russian activities in the future will rely on making sure that the price the Russians pay for such interference is sufficiently high. The UK intelligence and security community must ensure that private collaboration supports and complements continued public exposure of Russian activities, and the building of a broad international coalition that is willing to act quickly and decisively against Russian aggression.”
Government Response
“The Government agrees with the Committee that it would be appropriate for the Government to capitalise on its strengthened international relationships and push forward with a greater emphasis on exposing Russian Hostile State Activity multilaterally.
The UK has a record of taking strong action against Russian wrongdoing and will continue to work closely with allies to fully and robustly respond to the challenges Russia presents. We are grateful for the Committee’s recognition of the Government’s effective response to the Salisbury attack, expelling 23 undeclared intelligence officers with support from 28 countries and NATO, who expelled a further 130 Russian diplomats. This is clear evidence that, when necessary, the UK and its allies are able to act quickly and decisively together.
Specifically, the UK has worked with international partners to call out the malign influence and activities of Russia’s Military Intelligence (widely known as the GRU). Eleven countries joined the UK in attributing its ‘NotPetya’ attack in 2018, 19 countries plus the EU and NATO joined HMG in exposing the hacker-group APT28 as the GRU in 2018, and 20 countries plus the EU (a joint statement from all 27 Member States) joined the UK in condemning the GRU’s cyber-attack on Georgia in 2020. The UK also operates at the heart of the international community’s engagement on Ukraine: shaping international sanctions against Russia for its illegal annexation of Crimea; leading efforts in the UN to hold Russia to account; deepening NATO’s partnership with Ukraine; and launching the Ukraine Reform Conference series.
The adoption of a cyber sanctions regime by the EU in 2019, now also enshrined in UK legislation, increases our capabilities to respond to cyber-attacks. In addition, the Foreign Secretary announced in Parliament on 6 July that HMG is launching the UK Global Human Rights sanctions regime that enables HMG to sanction individuals involved in serious human rights abuses. Among the first listings, twenty five Russian Government officials have been sanctioned for their involvement in the death of Sergey Magnitsky whilst in detention. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2018) also includes relevant provisions that would allow for sanctions in the interests of national security, in the interests of international peace and security and to further a foreign policy objective of the UK government.
The Government will continue to increase our understanding of what the GRU is doing against the UK and our allies, to shine a light on their activities, to expose their methods and share these with our allies. We will deploy the full range of tools to counter the threat posed by the GRU and we will be working closely with our allies to defend ourselves.”
The UK has a record of taking strong action against Russian wrongdoing and will continue to work closely with allies to fully and robustly respond to the challenges Russia presents. We are grateful for the Committee’s recognition of the Government’s effective response to the Salisbury attack, expelling 23 undeclared intelligence officers with support from 28 countries and NATO, who expelled a further 130 Russian diplomats. This is clear evidence that, when necessary, the UK and its allies are able to act quickly and decisively together.
Specifically, the UK has worked with international partners to call out the malign influence and activities of Russia’s Military Intelligence (widely known as the GRU). Eleven countries joined the UK in attributing its ‘NotPetya’ attack in 2018, 19 countries plus the EU and NATO joined HMG in exposing the hacker-group APT28 as the GRU in 2018, and 20 countries plus the EU (a joint statement from all 27 Member States) joined the UK in condemning the GRU’s cyber-attack on Georgia in 2020. The UK also operates at the heart of the international community’s engagement on Ukraine: shaping international sanctions against Russia for its illegal annexation of Crimea; leading efforts in the UN to hold Russia to account; deepening NATO’s partnership with Ukraine; and launching the Ukraine Reform Conference series.
The adoption of a cyber sanctions regime by the EU in 2019, now also enshrined in UK legislation, increases our capabilities to respond to cyber-attacks. In addition, the Foreign Secretary announced in Parliament on 6 July that HMG is launching the UK Global Human Rights sanctions regime that enables HMG to sanction individuals involved in serious human rights abuses. Among the first listings, twenty five Russian Government officials have been sanctioned for their involvement in the death of Sergey Magnitsky whilst in detention. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2018) also includes relevant provisions that would allow for sanctions in the interests of national security, in the interests of international peace and security and to further a foreign policy objective of the UK government.
The Government will continue to increase our understanding of what the GRU is doing against the UK and our allies, to shine a light on their activities, to expose their methods and share these with our allies. We will deploy the full range of tools to counter the threat posed by the GRU and we will be working closely with our allies to defend ourselves.”
Assessment of Progress
Agreed.
10/10 – L
Middle East Strategy
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 138] Russia has also sought to expand its influence in the Middle East. Despite agreement that Russia’s exploitation of the power vacuum in Syria has been “one of the biggest setbacks” for UK foreign policy in 2018, we still do not consider that the UK has a clear approach to this issue. Russia views its intervention in support of the Assad regime as a success, and it is clear that its presence in Syria presents the West with difficulty in supporting peace in the region. Russia’s increased links with Iran, and trade initiatives with a range of countries in the Gulf area complicate the situation further. If HMG is to contribute to peace and security in the Middle East, the intelligence and security community must *** and the UK must have a clear strategy as to how this should be tackled.”
Government Response
“As the Committee notes, Russia has significantly increased its presence in the Middle East as a consequence of its intervention in the ongoing Syrian conflict. We have been clear that Russia must use its influence to persuade the Assad regime to end its military campaign and engage in a meaningful political process. In addition, the UK has called on Russia to use its relationship with the Iranian government to ensure Iran complies with its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA) and end its malign activity in the region.”
Assessment of Progress
Doesn’t directly address the recommendation and some action doesn’t equate to a clear strategy.
6/10 – ML
Communication Channels
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 143] Having limited channels of communication with the Russian government can be beneficial. The ability to have direct conversations enables an understanding of the intentions of both sides in times of crisis – ***. Having such channels in place can therefore reduce the risk of miscommunication and escalation of hostilities. It can also provide opportunities to de-conflict military activities in areas where both the UK and Russia have active military presences.”
Government Response
“The Committee notes that two of the five strategy pillars concern ‘proactive engagement and relationship-building’, both with the Russian Government and the Russian people. Official channels for dialogue are necessary for the national security reasons set out in the Committee’s report, as well as to engage Russia on matters of international security as fellow P5 members. The Prime Minister met President Putin in January 2020 at the Libya conference in Berlin.
The Foreign Secretary spoke to his counterpart Foreign Minister Lavrov in May regarding Syria and Ukraine. Senior officials meet regularly on bilateral and international issues. The Government has also fostered cultural and educational links with Russia, and sustained support for human rights defenders and other civil society actors who are under increased pressure from the Russian authorities.”
The Foreign Secretary spoke to his counterpart Foreign Minister Lavrov in May regarding Syria and Ukraine. Senior officials meet regularly on bilateral and international issues. The Government has also fostered cultural and educational links with Russia, and sustained support for human rights defenders and other civil society actors who are under increased pressure from the Russian authorities.”
Assessment of Progress
Agreed.
10/10 – L
Actions Have Consequences
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 12] More broadly, the way forward lies with taking action with our allies: a continuing international consensus is needed against Russian aggressive action. The West is strongest when it acts collectively and that is the way in which we can best attach a cost to Putin’s actions. The UK has shown it can shape the international response, as it did in response to the Salisbury attacks. It must now seek to build on this effort to ensure momentum is not lost.”
“[Paragraph 20] … When attacks can be traced back – and we accept that this is in itself resource-intensive – Government must always consider ‘naming and shaming.’”
“[Paragraph 25] …The Government must now leverage its diplomatic relationships to develop a common international approach when it comes to the attribution of malicious cyber activity by Russia and others.”
“[Paragraph 26] … It is imperative that there are now tangible developments in this area in light of the increasing threat from Russia (and others, including China, Iran and DPRK). Achieving a consensus on this common approach will be a challenging process, but as a leading proponent of the Rules Based International Order it is essential that the UK helps to promote and shape Rules of Engagement, working with our allies.”
“[Paragraph 20] … When attacks can be traced back – and we accept that this is in itself resource-intensive – Government must always consider ‘naming and shaming.’”
“[Paragraph 25] …The Government must now leverage its diplomatic relationships to develop a common international approach when it comes to the attribution of malicious cyber activity by Russia and others.”
“[Paragraph 26] … It is imperative that there are now tangible developments in this area in light of the increasing threat from Russia (and others, including China, Iran and DPRK). Achieving a consensus on this common approach will be a challenging process, but as a leading proponent of the Rules Based International Order it is essential that the UK helps to promote and shape Rules of Engagement, working with our allies.”
Government Response
“The UK Government has been at the forefront of demonstrating that there are consequences including through public attribution, co-ordinating use of existing deterrence tools and working to put in place new tools such as EU and UK cyber sanctions regimes. We have set out clearly how international law and norms of responsible state behaviour apply in cyberspace. We and our allies will continue to expose those that aim to do us and our institutions harm. No longer can they act with impunity in the shadows. We will continue to do so where we believe it is in the best interests of the UK to do so. Sometimes this is in public, sometimes we have private conversations with the country concerned. We consider ever case on its merits.
As cyberspace is essentially borderless, our response needs to be international – it is a foreign policy issue as much as a technical one. Working with international partners to deter and publicly expose those states, including Russia, responsible for malicious cyber activity has been a core component of the government’s work as set out in the 2016 National Cyber Security Strategy. Over the last four year, the UK has played a leading role internationally in developing a co-ordinated approach to cyber deterrence, sharing our own cyber deterrence toolkit with over twenty countries and holding workshops on how to politically attribute and use all the tools of government to respond to state-directed malicious cyber activity. This work has included China, Iran and DPRK – the Government has made political statements publicly exposing the role of actors from all three countries in carrying out malicious cyber activity, as well as raising concerns directly with countries in private and increasing awareness of the threat with international partners.
On 16 July, the Foreign Secretary, supported by the US and Canada, publicly exposed that the Russian Intelligence Services are collecting information on vaccine development and research into the COVID-19 virus.
The Committee will also be aware that following extensive analysis, the Government has concluded that it is almost certain that Russian actors sought to interfere in the 2019 General Election through the online amplification of illicitly acquired and leaked Government documents.
Whilst there is no evidence of a broad-spectrum Russian campaign against the election, any attempt to interfere in our democratic processes is completely unacceptable. There is an ongoing criminal investigation, and it would be inappropriate for us to say anything further at this point.”
As cyberspace is essentially borderless, our response needs to be international – it is a foreign policy issue as much as a technical one. Working with international partners to deter and publicly expose those states, including Russia, responsible for malicious cyber activity has been a core component of the government’s work as set out in the 2016 National Cyber Security Strategy. Over the last four year, the UK has played a leading role internationally in developing a co-ordinated approach to cyber deterrence, sharing our own cyber deterrence toolkit with over twenty countries and holding workshops on how to politically attribute and use all the tools of government to respond to state-directed malicious cyber activity. This work has included China, Iran and DPRK – the Government has made political statements publicly exposing the role of actors from all three countries in carrying out malicious cyber activity, as well as raising concerns directly with countries in private and increasing awareness of the threat with international partners.
On 16 July, the Foreign Secretary, supported by the US and Canada, publicly exposed that the Russian Intelligence Services are collecting information on vaccine development and research into the COVID-19 virus.
The Committee will also be aware that following extensive analysis, the Government has concluded that it is almost certain that Russian actors sought to interfere in the 2019 General Election through the online amplification of illicitly acquired and leaked Government documents.
Whilst there is no evidence of a broad-spectrum Russian campaign against the election, any attempt to interfere in our democratic processes is completely unacceptable. There is an ongoing criminal investigation, and it would be inappropriate for us to say anything further at this point.”
Assessment of Progress
Agreed.
9/10 – L
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