Tackling Disinformation
Disinformation can adversely affect or disrupt the UK’s democratic and political processes.
Below is our assessment of the government's response based on what was written in its July 2020 document. We will reassess how this in the light of how well the intended response has been implemented in July 2022. The grid gives our evaluation with a score.
Below is the relevant text from the report and the response.
Fragmented Response
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 37] The aim [of the Government’s Defending Democracy programme] is sound, but the response proposed is still rather fragmented (with at least ten separate teams within Government involved, as well as the Electoral Commission and Information Commissioner’s Office). In addition, it seems to have been afforded a rather low priority: it was only signed off by the National Security Council in February 2019, almost three years after the EU referendum campaign and the US presidential election which brought these issues to the fore. In the Committee’s view a foreign power seeking to interfere in our democratic processes – whether it is successful or not – cannot be taken lightly: our democracy is intrinsic to our country’s success and well-being and any threat to it must be treated as a serious national security issue by those tasked with defending us.”
Government Response
“The Government’s aim is to reduce the potential impact of disinformation on UK democracy, society, economic and national security interests, in line with our democratic values. While the Cabinet Office leads the ‘Defending Democracy’ programme, it is clear that the threat posed by disinformation is not to democratic principles alone, as evidenced by COVID-19 disinformation.
DCMS holds the lead responsibility for the Government’s overall counter-disinformation policy, including setting the direction, focus and principles of domestic policy; leading the Government’s engagement with social media companies and the media; working with external partners in industry, academia, and civil society to further the aims of the strategy; and representing and promoting our domestic approach amongst our international partners and the public. The department is uniquely positioned to consider the cross-cutting threats to the information environment. While Hostile State Activity from states such as Russia poses a significant threat, there are a range of other malign actors the UK must tackle.
Since evidence was provided to the Committee by DCMS in January 2019, the department has taken a number of steps to progress the Government’s policy and operational response to address this important issue. Over the last year, DCMS has introduced robust structures for the Government’s counter-disinformation operational response. This includes the establishment of a cross-Whitehall Counter-Disinformation Unit (CDU), which brings together cross Government capabilities, including monitoring, analysis and strategic communications with teams from DCMS, the Home Office, the FCO and the Cabinet Office providing a comprehensive picture of the extent, scope and potential impact of disinformation.
The CDU previously stood up in support of the European Parliamentary and General Elections in 2019 and has been contributing to the Government’s COVID-19 response. COVID-19 disinformation (and misinformation, i.e., the inadvertent sharing of false information) has presented a sustained and evolving threat to the information environment. Given the range of poor quality and potentially harmful information that we have seen in relation to the pandemic, the COVID-19 response has reaffirmed the need to take an actor-agnostic approach. It is vitally important that at this or any other time of increased vulnerability, the public has accurate information.
Through the world-leading Online Harms framework, DCMS is developing potential regulatory and non-regulatory interventions to help make the UK the safest place to be online. The Online Harms framework will establish a new duty of care on companies which will require them to put appropriate systems and processes in place to improve the safety of their users. The regulation will establish differentiated expectations on companies for illegal content and activity, versus conduct that may not be illegal but has the potential to cause harm to individuals. Companies will be able to determine what type of legal content or behaviour is acceptable on their services and will need to set this out clearly in their terms and conditions and enforce these effectively, consistently and transparently. Alongside the proposed regulatory framework, we are committed to implementing a number of non-legislative measures in order to ensure a holistic response to online harms, including a media literacy strategy, to be published later this year, which will support users to spot risks and think critically about the content they see online.”
DCMS holds the lead responsibility for the Government’s overall counter-disinformation policy, including setting the direction, focus and principles of domestic policy; leading the Government’s engagement with social media companies and the media; working with external partners in industry, academia, and civil society to further the aims of the strategy; and representing and promoting our domestic approach amongst our international partners and the public. The department is uniquely positioned to consider the cross-cutting threats to the information environment. While Hostile State Activity from states such as Russia poses a significant threat, there are a range of other malign actors the UK must tackle.
Since evidence was provided to the Committee by DCMS in January 2019, the department has taken a number of steps to progress the Government’s policy and operational response to address this important issue. Over the last year, DCMS has introduced robust structures for the Government’s counter-disinformation operational response. This includes the establishment of a cross-Whitehall Counter-Disinformation Unit (CDU), which brings together cross Government capabilities, including monitoring, analysis and strategic communications with teams from DCMS, the Home Office, the FCO and the Cabinet Office providing a comprehensive picture of the extent, scope and potential impact of disinformation.
The CDU previously stood up in support of the European Parliamentary and General Elections in 2019 and has been contributing to the Government’s COVID-19 response. COVID-19 disinformation (and misinformation, i.e., the inadvertent sharing of false information) has presented a sustained and evolving threat to the information environment. Given the range of poor quality and potentially harmful information that we have seen in relation to the pandemic, the COVID-19 response has reaffirmed the need to take an actor-agnostic approach. It is vitally important that at this or any other time of increased vulnerability, the public has accurate information.
Through the world-leading Online Harms framework, DCMS is developing potential regulatory and non-regulatory interventions to help make the UK the safest place to be online. The Online Harms framework will establish a new duty of care on companies which will require them to put appropriate systems and processes in place to improve the safety of their users. The regulation will establish differentiated expectations on companies for illegal content and activity, versus conduct that may not be illegal but has the potential to cause harm to individuals. Companies will be able to determine what type of legal content or behaviour is acceptable on their services and will need to set this out clearly in their terms and conditions and enforce these effectively, consistently and transparently. Alongside the proposed regulatory framework, we are committed to implementing a number of non-legislative measures in order to ensure a holistic response to online harms, including a media literacy strategy, to be published later this year, which will support users to spot risks and think critically about the content they see online.”
Assessment of Progress
Fragmentation evidently remains an issue and not clear that the DCMS is resourced for this role.
5/10 – MH
Social Media Protocol
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 35] …The Government must now seek to establish a protocol with the social media providers to ensure that they take covert hostile state use of their platforms seriously and have clear timescales within which they commit to removing such material. Government should ‘name and shame’ those which fail to act. Such a protocol could, usefully, be expanded to encompass the other areas in which action is required from the social media companies, since this issue is not unique to hostile state activity. This matter is, in our view, urgent and we expect the Government to report on progress in this area as soon as possible.”
Government Response
“We recognise that one of the most important levers to tackle disinformation and other forms of online manipulation is through building strong relationships with the social media companies to ensure that appropriate action is being taken to address issues on their platforms. As the departmental lead for Digital policy, DCMS leads these relationships.
Through the DCMS-led CDU, the Government has established strong relationships with the companies, and have been given access to accelerated reporting portals. This allows the Government to quickly identify content which is in breach of platform terms and conditions, to ensure that platforms can take appropriate action such as removal of content or suspension of accounts.
In addition, the Home Office already works closely with social media companies to prevent terrorist use of the internet. In 2010, the Government set up the police Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), based in the Metropolitan Police. To date, in excess of 310,000 individual pieces of terrorist content referred by CTIRU have been removed by companies and the Unit has also informed the design of the EU Internet Referral Unit based at Europol.
The Government has pressed companies to increase the use of technology to automate the detection and removal of content where possible. The Government is also working in partnership with UK Data Science companies to develop technical solutions to aid in quicker detection and removal of terrorist content and offer these free of charge, to enable companies to take quicker action on terrorist content. The Government’s relationship with the social media companies continues to evolve. In the context of the COVID-19 response, we are learning valuable lessons which will be applied to our future approach to countering disinformation and other forms of online manipulation. While the Government welcomes the actions taken by social media companies thus far, including the cooperation they have shown in tackling these issues together, there still issues to be addressed. DCMS will continue pushing platforms to take the actions necessary to improve and safeguard the information environment.”
Through the DCMS-led CDU, the Government has established strong relationships with the companies, and have been given access to accelerated reporting portals. This allows the Government to quickly identify content which is in breach of platform terms and conditions, to ensure that platforms can take appropriate action such as removal of content or suspension of accounts.
In addition, the Home Office already works closely with social media companies to prevent terrorist use of the internet. In 2010, the Government set up the police Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), based in the Metropolitan Police. To date, in excess of 310,000 individual pieces of terrorist content referred by CTIRU have been removed by companies and the Unit has also informed the design of the EU Internet Referral Unit based at Europol.
The Government has pressed companies to increase the use of technology to automate the detection and removal of content where possible. The Government is also working in partnership with UK Data Science companies to develop technical solutions to aid in quicker detection and removal of terrorist content and offer these free of charge, to enable companies to take quicker action on terrorist content. The Government’s relationship with the social media companies continues to evolve. In the context of the COVID-19 response, we are learning valuable lessons which will be applied to our future approach to countering disinformation and other forms of online manipulation. While the Government welcomes the actions taken by social media companies thus far, including the cooperation they have shown in tackling these issues together, there still issues to be addressed. DCMS will continue pushing platforms to take the actions necessary to improve and safeguard the information environment.”
Assessment of Progress
Action appears to be very slow, with little or no appetite to ‘name and shame’.
MH – 3/10
Regulation
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 38] The regulation of political advertising falls outside this Committee’s remit. We agree, however, with the DCMS Select Committee’s conclusion that the regulatory framework needs urgent review if it is to be fit for purpose in the age of widespread social media. In particular, we note and affirm their recommendation that all online political adverts should include an imprint stating who is paying for it. We would add to that a requirement for social media providers to cooperate with MI5 where it is suspected that a hostile foreign state may be covertly running a campaign.”
Government Response
“The Government remains committed to ensuring elections and campaigning rules are fit for the modern age. Following the 2019 General election, we are considering how best to take forward our work in this area. Further details will be announced in due course.
Government has committed to increasing transparency over who is promoting material online. This will be addressed as part of our proposed digital imprints regime. Through new imprints on digital election material, we will strengthen trust and ensure people are informed about who is behind online election material. We will continue to strive to uphold transparency in the digital campaigning framework. The Cabinet Office is taking forward work in this area.
As set our above, DCMS is working closely with the social media companies to ensure that there are appropriate systems in place to quickly identify and respond to manipulative behaviour on their platforms.”
Government has committed to increasing transparency over who is promoting material online. This will be addressed as part of our proposed digital imprints regime. Through new imprints on digital election material, we will strengthen trust and ensure people are informed about who is behind online election material. We will continue to strive to uphold transparency in the digital campaigning framework. The Cabinet Office is taking forward work in this area.
As set our above, DCMS is working closely with the social media companies to ensure that there are appropriate systems in place to quickly identify and respond to manipulative behaviour on their platforms.”
Assessment of Progress
No clear strategy for regulation.
H – 2/10
Computer Misuse
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 121] …The Computer Misuse Act should be updated to reflect modern use of personal electronic devices.”
Government Response
“The Computer Misuse Act (CMA) has undergone several amendments to ensure it keeps pace with the evolving threat, including most recently in 2015. The Home Office keeps the CMA under regular review to determine any potential benefits and drawbacks of legislative change, including through engagement with the cyber security sector.”
Assessment of Progress
No sign that the 2015 Act will be updated.
2/10 – H
Responding to Disinformation
Tackling disinformation is one of the key subjects of the Russia report.