Protecting Democratic Processes
Democracy is intrinsic to our country's success and wellbeing
Below is our assessment of the government's response based on what was written in its July 2020 document. We will reassess how this in the light of how well the intended response has been implemented in July 2022.
The grid gives our evaluation with a score. Below is the relevant text from the report and the response.
The grid gives our evaluation with a score. Below is the relevant text from the report and the response.
Protecting UK Democratic Processes
From the UK Government’s Statement on the Defending Democracy Programme:
“Since the Committee took evidence in January 2019, the Government has established the Defending Democracy programme, strengthened cross-Government counter disinformation capability and established frameworks to counter state sponsored influence campaigns, and oversee election security. The Cabinet Office established the Defending Democracy programme to bring together our work to safeguard our democratic processes and to make sure that our democracy remains safe and inclusive, now and into the future. The Programme was formally announced in July 2019. It brings together capabilities and expertise from Government departments, the Security and Intelligence Agencies and civil society to ensure UK democracy remains open and vibrant as well as secure. Given the cross cutting nature of this task, the Minister for the Cabinet Office, supported by Cabinet Office Officials, coordinates work to secure UK Democracy. The programme has four priorities:
- Protect and Secure UK Democratic Processes, Systems, and Institutions from Interference, including from Cyber, Personnel, and Physical Threats
- Strengthen the Integrity of UK Elections
- Encourage Respect for Open, Fair, and Safe Democratic Participation
- Promote Fact-Based and Open Discourse, including Online Discourse
Through the “Protect” elements of the programme, we have taken steps to ensure our institutions and core electoral mechanics are secured against interference, including information operations and direct attacks on electoral infrastructure. Cabinet Office, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC, a part of GCHQ) and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) continue to work closely with Political Parties and Government departments as well as local and devolved Government to update and disseminate security advice and raise awareness of threats, including foreign interference.
During the May 2019 European Elections and the December 2019 General Election, we stood up a cross-Government election security cell to monitor and respond to emerging issues during election periods. This brought together staff from Government departments and agencies to share information and coordinate responses to threats and hazards relating to the election, from severe weather through to foreign interference.
During the UK General Election 2019, and as part of their ongoing work, CPNI and NCSC provided cyber and protective security guidance for local authorities and political parties as well as individuals such as candidates.
The NCSC meets regularly with the UK’s Parliamentary Parties and works closely with those responsible for core parts of the UK’s electoral infrastructure such as the Cabinet Office’s ‘Register to Vote’ service. This work was prioritised during the pre-election period.”
During the May 2019 European Elections and the December 2019 General Election, we stood up a cross-Government election security cell to monitor and respond to emerging issues during election periods. This brought together staff from Government departments and agencies to share information and coordinate responses to threats and hazards relating to the election, from severe weather through to foreign interference.
During the UK General Election 2019, and as part of their ongoing work, CPNI and NCSC provided cyber and protective security guidance for local authorities and political parties as well as individuals such as candidates.
The NCSC meets regularly with the UK’s Parliamentary Parties and works closely with those responsible for core parts of the UK’s electoral infrastructure such as the Cabinet Office’s ‘Register to Vote’ service. This work was prioritised during the pre-election period.”
Ministerial Responsibility
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 33] Protecting our democratic discourse and processes from hostile foreign interference is a central responsibility of Government and should be a ministerial priority.”
Government Response
“The UK’s free and open democracy is one of our nation’s greatest strengths. However, we know that certain states seek to exploit our open system to sow division and undermine trust in our democracy, and those of our allies, through disinformation, cyber-attacks and other methods. We have made clear that any foreign interference in the UK’s Democratic processes is completely unacceptable. It is, and always will be, an absolute priority to protect the UK against foreign interference, whether from Russia or any other state.
We have worked with industry, civil society and international partners to implement robust systems to secure our Democratic processes and deter attempts to interfere in it. This work is undertaken with the utmost regard for the freedom of the press, political and parliamentary discourse and freedom of speech. We will always balance the need to secure our Democracy with our duty to uphold our values.”
We have worked with industry, civil society and international partners to implement robust systems to secure our Democratic processes and deter attempts to interfere in it. This work is undertaken with the utmost regard for the freedom of the press, political and parliamentary discourse and freedom of speech. We will always balance the need to secure our Democracy with our duty to uphold our values.”
Assessment of Progress
Agreed. There is now a cabinet minister in charge of defending democracy: however there are no significant announcements about action.
10/10 – L
Electoral Commission Powers
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 122] The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee has already asked the Government “whether current legislation to protect the electoral process from malign interference is sufficient. Legislation should be in line with the latest technological developments”. We note that physical interference in the UK’s democratic processes is less likely given the use of a paper-based system – however, we support the DCMS Select Committee’s calls for the Electoral Commission to be given power to “stop someone acting illegally in a campaign if they live outside the UK”.”
“[Paragraph 123] Separately, there is the question of influence over our democratic processes. Questions have been raised over whether Electoral law is sufficiently up to date, given “the move from physical billboards to online, micro-targeted political campaigning”. We note – and, again, agree with the DCMS Select Committee – that “the UK is clearly vulnerable to covert digital influence campaigns”. In this respect we have already questioned whether the Electoral Commission has sufficient powers to ensure the security of democratic processes where hostile state threats are involved: if it is to tackle foreign interference then it must be given the necessary legislative powers.”
“[Paragraph 124] We also emphasise the need to ensure that the focus is not solely on national events and bodies. It is important to include local authorities, ***. We were encouraged that this issue seems to have been recognised and that action is being taken.”
“[Paragraph 123] Separately, there is the question of influence over our democratic processes. Questions have been raised over whether Electoral law is sufficiently up to date, given “the move from physical billboards to online, micro-targeted political campaigning”. We note – and, again, agree with the DCMS Select Committee – that “the UK is clearly vulnerable to covert digital influence campaigns”. In this respect we have already questioned whether the Electoral Commission has sufficient powers to ensure the security of democratic processes where hostile state threats are involved: if it is to tackle foreign interference then it must be given the necessary legislative powers.”
“[Paragraph 124] We also emphasise the need to ensure that the focus is not solely on national events and bodies. It is important to include local authorities, ***. We were encouraged that this issue seems to have been recognised and that action is being taken.”
Government Response
“Through the ‘Strengthen’ pillar of the Defending Democracy programme the Government is reinforcing the overall integrity of our electoral processes by increasing transparency in digital campaigning, in line with the Committee’s recommendation. In summer 2019, the Government announced that it will implement an imprints regime for digital election material. This will ensure greater transparency and make it clearer to the electorate who has produced and promoted online political materials.
The Cabinet Office is working closely with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and other stakeholders to confirm the details of how such regulations will be put in place. The Government is planning to bring forward the technical proposals on the regime and further detail will be announced in due course.
The Government notes the Committee’s comments on the Electoral Commission, and we continue to consider the recommendations from the Electoral Commission itself to enhance their powers. The Commission has civil sanctioning powers that apply to referendums and elections. More serious criminal matters can and are referred to the police, and then considered by a court of law. The courts have the power to levy unlimited fines. We must ensure that regulation is proportionate. Political parties vary considerably in size and professionalism and it is important to ensure that regulation of them is fair and proportionate so as not to undermine local democracy or discourage engagement.”
The Cabinet Office is working closely with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and other stakeholders to confirm the details of how such regulations will be put in place. The Government is planning to bring forward the technical proposals on the regime and further detail will be announced in due course.
The Government notes the Committee’s comments on the Electoral Commission, and we continue to consider the recommendations from the Electoral Commission itself to enhance their powers. The Commission has civil sanctioning powers that apply to referendums and elections. More serious criminal matters can and are referred to the police, and then considered by a court of law. The courts have the power to levy unlimited fines. We must ensure that regulation is proportionate. Political parties vary considerably in size and professionalism and it is important to ensure that regulation of them is fair and proportionate so as not to undermine local democracy or discourage engagement.”
Assessment of Progress
Drafting legislation for an imprints regime and considering new powers for Electoral Commission.
5/10 – MH
Assessment of Referendum
Report Recommendations
“[Paragraph 47] …Whilst the issues at stake in the EU referendum campaign are less clear-cut, it is nonetheless the Committee’s view that the UK intelligence and security community should produce an analogous assessment of potential Russian interference in the EU referendum and that an unclassified summary of it be published.”
Government Response
“We have seen no evidence of successful interference in the EU Referendum. The Intelligence and Security Agencies produce and contribute to regular assessments of the threat posed by Hostile State Activity, including around potential interference in UK democratic processes. We keep such assessments under review and, where necessary, update them in response to new intelligence, including during democratic events such as elections and referendums.
Where new information emerges, the Government will always consider the most appropriate use of any intelligence it develops or receives, including whether it is appropriate to make this public. Given this long standing approach, a retrospective assessment of the EU Referendum is not necessary.”
Where new information emerges, the Government will always consider the most appropriate use of any intelligence it develops or receives, including whether it is appropriate to make this public. Given this long standing approach, a retrospective assessment of the EU Referendum is not necessary.”
Assessment of Progress
Refusal to do
1/10 – H
Safeguarding Our Democracy
Protecting the UK’s democratic process from outside interference is of paramount importance.